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CONTEXTUALIST ANSWERS TO THE 
CHALLENGE FROM DISAGREEMENT1
abstract
In this short paper I survey recent contextualist answers to the challenge from disagreement raised by 
contemporary relativists. After making the challenge vivid by means of a working example, I specify the 
notion of disagreement lying at the heart of the challenge. The answers are grouped in three categories, 
the first characterized by rejecting the intuition of disagreement in certain cases, the second by 
conceiving disagreement as a clash of non-cognitive attitudes and the third by relegating disagreement 
at the pragmatic level. For each category I present several important variants and raise some (general) 
criticisms. The paper is meant to offer a quick introduction to the current contextualist literature on 
disagreement and thus a useful tool for further research.
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CONTEXTUALIST ANSWERS TO THE CHALLENGE FROM DISAGREEMENT
Suppose I utter the sentence1
(1) Marmitako2 is delicious,
and my lifelong friend and partner in culinary endeavors utters its negation. On the face of 
it, we disagree. After all, at minimum, I claim that a certain food (marmitako) has a certain 
property (being delicious), while my friend claims that the same food doesn’t have that 
property. This looks like a textbook case of disagreement.
Such (admittedly raw) data has played a great role in the contemporary debate between 
various semantic views about predicates of taste and similar subjective – or, as I will 
refer to them throughout this paper, perspectival expressions. The main characteristic of 
perspectival expressions is that appeal to a subject’s perspective is needed for their semantic 
interpretation. Besides predicates of taste like ‘delicious’, aesthetic adjectives like ‘beautiful’, 
moral terms like ‘good’ or ‘ought’, epistemic modals like ‘might’ and ‘must’, gradable adjectives 
like ‘tall’, epistemic vocabulary like ‘know’ have been thought of as perspectival. What 
counts as a “perspective” in each case is, of course, different, but here I’m using the term in 
a broad sense to refer to whatever element captures the subjective character of the relevant 
expressions.
The point of drawing attention to exchanges like the one between my friend and I about 
marmitako was to show that certain views in the debate cannot accommodate the intuition of 
disagreement that seems to be present in the exchanges in question. For example, according 
to the view in the debate focused on in this paper – contextualism – when speakers utter 
sentences like (1) or their negations, the propositions they express are perspective-specific – that 
is, perspectives are part of the expressed propositions. In contrast, for contextualism’s main 
rival, relativism, when speakers utter sentences like (1) or their negations, the semantic contents 
they express are perspective-neutral, with perspectives being relegated to the “circumstances 
of evaluation” (a technical term familiar from Kaplan (1989), comprising possible and actual 
1  I would like to thank the editors of this issue and two anonymous referees of the paper for their comments. Work 
on this paper has been financially supported by a MINECO “Juan de la Cierva” postdoctoral grant, the Foundations and 
Methods of Natural Language Semantics project at the University of Barcelona and the Lexical Meaning and Concepts project 




situations in which an utterance is evaluated for truth).3 And while the perspectives relevant 
for evaluating each utterance can be the same, they need not be: in the exchange above, for 
example, the perspective relevant for the interpretation of my utterance is mine, while that 
relevant for the interpretation of my friend’s utterance is hers. In this case, disagreement – at 
least in an intuitive understanding of it – is not accounted for by the contextualist.
This, in a nutshell, is the challenge from disagreement that present day relativists have leveled 
against contextualism. Recently, however, several ways to meet the challenge have surfaced 
in the literature. While some of those ways have been sporadically engaged with, and while 
a number of papers describe various strategies available to contextualists (e.g., Stojanovic, 
2007; Marques & Garcia-Carpintero, 2014; Silk, 2016; Khoo, 2017), a detailed systematization 
of the answers and their variants has not been done. The present paper aims to do precisely 
that. This will provide both a quick introduction to the latest dialectical moves of the 
debate focused on and a (hopefully) useful resource for future research. And while I focus 
on predicates of taste for illustration, the same strategies are possible (and some have been 
proposed) for other perspectival expressions as well.
Before getting to the strategies mentioned, it would be useful to spell out what the notion 
of disagreement that the proponents of the challenge have relied on is. Although the case 
for disagreement is well supported by intuitions,4 relativists have relied on a specific way of 
understanding disagreement: as involving certain types of cognitive attitudes (belief, judgment, 
acceptance etc.) directed towards propositions. What exactly is the nature of the cognitive 
attitude involved in disagreement varies among relativists; here I rest content with describing 
the attitudes in question as “doxastic”, while leaving open their exact nature.5 The following 
characterization is I think in line with what most relativists have taken disagreement to be:6
Doxastic Disagreement (DD)
Two interlocutors disagree if they have opposite doxastic attitudes towards the same 
proposition.7
The contextualist conundrum can be understood by attending to (DD) in the following way: in 
order for the exchange between my friend and I about marmitako to count as disagreement, 
3  The terminology here is not ideally clear. As a referee points out, historically, views that have been called by 
their proponents “relativism” turn out to be, in the more recent understanding of the term, contextualist views (e.g. 
Harman, 1996; Dreier, 1990). Things are further complicated by the fact that authors like MacFarlane (2014) reserve 
the term ‘relativism’ to a certain view about the absoluteness of utterance/propositional truth. Here I take relativism 
to be the general view, exemplified above, that the perspectival character of the relevant expressions is to be 
accounted for by postulating a corresponding parameter in the circumstances of evaluation.
4  Or so I will assume for the purposes of this paper. Most contextualists agree that such intuitions exist, and they 
attempt to solve the challenge from disagreement by taking them at face value. See, however, the discussion in section 1.
5  I also leave it open whether disagreement can happen with other types of cognitive but non-doxastic attitudes such 
as assuming, enquiring, doubting etc. as well.
6  See, for example, Kölbel (2004), Lasersohn (2005, 2016) etc. Famously, MacFarlane (2007, 2014) argues against 
(DD); Marques (2014) does too. However, the condition specified by (DD) remains a part of both author’s proposed 
replacements: it is part of MacFarlane’s improved definitions of disagreement (see “CAN’T BE BOTH ACCURATE 
(RELATIVE TO C)” in MacFarlane (2007, p. 26) and the various notions discussed in MacFarlane (2014, chapter 6)) 
and of Marques revised notion (“Doxastic Disagreement” in Marques (2014, p. 132)). Marques also notes that, strictly 
speaking, it is enough for disagreement to have opposite attitudes towards a proposition (on one hand) and a 
proposition entailed by the negation of the first proposition (on the other hand). The point is well taken; however, the 
fix is easily available (Marques provides one herself).
7  A relevant distinction must be mentioned here: that between disagreement in act and disagreement in state 
(Cappelen & Hawthorne, 2009). Given that I deal here with exchanges, the former notion seems more suitable; 
however, this shouldn’t be taken to mean that the latter notion is not more fundamental.
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we have to hold opposite doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition. But if the 
propositions expressed by each of us is perspective-specific – so that the proposition expressed 
by my utterance of (1) is that marmitako is delicious to me (or to a group I belong to), while 
the proposition expressed by my friend uttering the negation of (1) is that marmitako is not 
delicious to her (or to a group she belongs to) – then, according to (DD), the exchange doesn’t 
count as disagreement. Yet, the intuition is that my friend and I disagree; hence, the challenge. 
On the other hand, relativism gets the data right: given that the propositions expressed by 
my friend and I in the exchange above are perspective-neutral, there is a proposition we have 
opposite attitudes towards: namely, the proposition that marmitako is delicious, full stop.8
One immediate reaction to the challenge from contextualist quarters has been to question 
the disagreement data. This has not been done by flat-out denying that the intuition of 
disagreement in exchanges like the one between my friend and I about marmitako exists, 
but more indirectly by questioning the dialectical import of such exchanges and by claiming 
that, when they are suitably fleshed out, the contextualist can yield disagreement, even if 
conceived along the lines of (DD). Thus, contextualists have complained that the scenarios 
provided by relativists are too skeletal to support solid intuitions about disagreement. For 
example, Schaffer claims that “the case for relativism relies on a misrepresentative sample 
of underdeveloped cases” (Schaffer 2011, p. 211), and other authors (e.g., Glanzberg, 2007; 
Stojanovic, 2007; Cappelen & Hawthorne, 2009) have expressed similar opinions. Such authors 
then proceed to flesh out the said scenarios by employing uses of perspectival expressions 
that, if not strictly speaking neglected by relativists, have not been their main focus in 
mounting the challenge.
So, what are these uses contextualists have appealed to in the case of predicates of taste? First, 
predicates of taste and other perspectival expressions can be used exocentrically (that is, from 
another person’s perspective), as opposed to egocentrically (from one’s own perspective). The 
exchange between my friend and I regarding marmitako can be interpreted in a way in which 
we both use ‘delicious’ from another person’s perspective (we are trying to decide where 
to take a common friend out for lunch on her birthday, say, and thus we both speak from 
her perspective), or as my friend trying to correct me about marmitako, given my previous 
unpleasant experiences with the food (thus speaking from my perspective).9 Second, the 
expressions at stake can be used collectively (that is, from the perspective of a group). The 
exchange between my friend and I can thus be interpreted in a way in which we both use 
‘delicious’ collectively (we are trying to decide where to organize the next department lunch, 
say, and thus we speak from the perspective of the entire group). Finally, the predicates in 
question can be used generically (that is, they convey how things stand from the perspective of 
the majority, or how things usually are seen). The exchange between my friend and I can thus 
be interpreted in a way in which we both use ‘delicious’ generically (we are discussing whether 
marmitako is generally considered delicious). In each of these cases the contextualist has an 
easy time explaining disagreement: given that in each case the relevant perspectives are the 
same, disagreement can be cashed out as two interlocutors having opposite attitudes towards 
the same proposition (albeit different in each case), which is exactly as (DD) requires.
Now, it is obvious that this much won’t get the contextualist too far. And although it is 
hard to deny that predicates of taste and other perspectival expressions do have the uses 
8  There is a further issue whether relativists do indeed capture disagreement; I ignore this issue here. 
9  Each of these interpretations becomes more natural when embedded in larger chunks of discourse. For lack of 
space, I leave this to the imagination of the reader.
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mentioned above, they also have other uses for which disagreement is not accounted for 
(these are the same ones that proponents of the challenge, either explicitly or implicitly, have 
focused on – see Kölbel, 2004; Lasersohn, 2005 etc.). To give just one obvious example, the 
exchange between my friend and I can be interpreted in a way in which we both use ‘delicious’ 
egocentrically. This seems to be the main use of such predicates underlying the challenge, and 
in such a case the contextualist doesn’t get disagreement, since there is no single proposition 
the interlocutors can have opposite attitudes towards.
However – and this is the catch –, the trend under scrutiny accompanies the showcase of 
examples in which disagreement can be accounted for with a denial that the intuition of 
disagreement is present in the case described above. Coupling the claim that disagreements 
in cases where predicates of taste are used exocentrically, collectively and generically can 
be accounted for with the claim that there are no other cases of disagreement is certainly 
one way to solve the issue. But, crucially, much hinges on the reasons given for this latter 
claim. Sometimes the reason given is merely lack of the relevant intuition (e.g., Glanzberg, 
2007). It might be impossible to argue about intuitions, but simply leaving things at that is 
deeply unsatisfactory because it raises the methodological issue of which intuitions to rely 
on, while flat-out rejecting those who are problematic for one’s theory is most probably not 
a valid methodological practice. In other cases, however, certain considerations are brought 
to support the claim. For example, both Stojanovic (2007) and Moltmann (2010) raise the 
issue of what the topic of disagreement could be when interlocutors use predicates of taste 
egocentrically, and the issue of the point of engaging in such disputes. Others, like Cappelen 
& Hawthorne (2009), argue by analogy with cases in which the intuition of disagreement is 
lacking. This is not the place to take up such arguments;10 what I want to point out here is that 
this strategy has the potential to meet the challenge from disagreement if the arguments to 
the effect that in the relevant cases disagreement is impossible are sound. Whether this is so, 
and thus, whether the present contextualist strategy is successful, still remains to be seen.
Disagreement has been conceived by the relativist as a clash of cognitive (i.e., doxastic) 
attitudes. But, intuitively, at least, there are other ways of disagreeing. For example, when one 
person likes something (say, a certain food), while the other doesn’t like that same thing, we 
can felicitously say that they disagree. If so, disagreement may not involve doxastic attitudes 
or propositions. This suggests that the disagreement in exchanges like the one between my 
friend and I about marmitako could be said to involve attitudes that are not cognitive in 
nature towards mere objects, thus explicitly rejecting (DD).
This intuitive idea finds support in philosophical literature. In tackling the issue of 
disagreement in relation to expressivism, Stevenson (1944) draws a distinction between 
“disagreement in attitude” and “disagreement in belief”,11 the former comprising ways 
of disagreeing like the one mentioned above. Recent contextualists have borrowed this 
distinction and have made it part of their answer to the challenge from disagreement by 
interpreting disagreements like the one between my friend and I about marmitako as a clash 
of opposite non-cognitive attitudes (Huvenes, 2012, 2014; Lopez de Sa, 2015; Marques, 2015, 
2016; Marques & García-Carpintero, 2014; Stojanovic, 2012; Sundell, 2011). How exactly to 
cash out this disagreement is a choice point for contextualists. Huvenes (2012), for example, 
is uncommitted with respect to the exact nature of the attitudes involved in disagreement, 
10  I do that in Zeman (2016); my conclusions are negative.
11  See Ridge (2012) for a detailed discussion of Stevenson’s distinction. See also Huvenes (2017) for expressing 
skepticism that the distinction is ideal.
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remaining content with following the expressivist orthodoxy that they are attitudes of 
approval or disapproval towards the object the relevant expression is predicated of. More 
detailed versions are available too. Marques & García-Carpintero (2014), for example, claim 
that the attitude involved is a special type of desire: what they call “desire de nobis” – that 
is, a desire about a collective course of action, based on our evolutionarily developed need 
to find solutions to coordination problems. This view also brings to the fore the idea that 
disagreements often arise in cases in which the people involved face a practical decision 
(similar points have been made by Stojanovic, 2012 and Marques, 2015). In another version 
of this strategy, that of Marques, the attitudes involved in disagreement are second-order 
desires: desires that the interlocutors desire to desire the object that the relevant predicate is 
predicated of (2016, p. 23).
Appeal to “disagreement in attitude” also marks a point of convergence between 
contextualism and expressivism – in particular, “hybrid” versions of the latter (for a 
representative sample of papers, see Fletcher & Ridge, 2014). The distinctive feature of hybrid 
expressivism is that in uttering sentences containing perspectival expressions a speaker 
expresses a non-cognitive attitude of sorts, but also asserts a proposition. The non-cognitive 
attitude expressed and the proposition asserted can be thought of as different levels of 
meaning/content. And while some authors claim that “[o]ne can think of disagreement [as 
clash of non-cognitive attitudes] without endorsing expressivism” (Huvenes, 2011, p. 13), 
many expressivist views are contextualist in holding that the propositions asserted by uttering 
sentences containing a perspectival expression are perspective-specific.12 To give only two 
examples from recent literature on predicates of taste: Buekens (2011) postulates a level of 
meaning in addition to the perspective-specific proposition asserted, a level of meaning he 
calls “affective-evaluative” and which consists in the speaker’s attitude of approval towards 
the object a predicate of taste is predicated of. In a similar vein, Gutzmann (2016) distinguishes 
between a truth-conditional level (the perspective-specific proposition) and a “use-
conditional” level, the latter consisting in a “deontic attitude towards what shall count as [P] 
in the utterance context” (Gutzmann, 2016, p. 45), where “P” is a predicate of taste. In addition 
to postulating two levels of meaning/content, Gutzmann’s view is also explicitly normative. It is 
important to note that part of the motivation for such contextualist-cum-hybrid-expressivist 
views is precisely answering to the challenge from disagreement.
This contextualist strategy to answer the challenge from disagreement has a lot in its favor. 
For one thing, it captures the intuitive idea that disagreements need not involve propositions, 
and that a mere clash of non-cognitive attitudes is sufficient for disagreement. Second, it 
also captures the equally intuitive ideas that a normative component is sometimes present 
in uttering sentences like (1) and that many of our disagreements take place against a 
background in which a practical issue needs solving. However, interpreting all disagreements 
featuring perspectival expressions as practical or as normative might go one step too far. 
For example, there seem to be scenarios in which no practical issue is at stake: suppose, for 
instance, that my friend and I are not pressed to find a place to eat, we are not planning to 
organize a lunch etc., but merely ponder over the culinary virtues of marmitako – perhaps 
in comparison with other foods.13 On the other hand, it seems very intuitive that in ordinary 
12  Of course, being a broader view with many variants, hybrid expressivism comprises also views according to which 
the propositions asserted by uttering sentences containing a perspectival expression are perspective-neutral (e.g., 
Boisvert, 2008), or even propositions that are semantically incomplete (e.g., Clapp, 2015).
13  In a certain sense, all issues are practical – namely, in the sense of solving theoretical issues for the sake of 




scenarios people don’t mean to make normative claims, but they simply utter sentences 
like (1) to express their preferences. When faced with contradictory sentences that signal 
disagreement, they might just retreat to qualifications like ‘delicious to me’. If uttering 
sentences like (1) would always have a normative component, it is not clear what the point 
of such a retreat would be.14 Such cases put pressure on the corresponding variants of the 
strategy scrutinized. As for the very idea of clash of non-cognitive attitudes itself, note first 
(as a few contextualists have themselves argued) that it is not entirely clear under which 
conditions a mere clash of attitudes amounts to a full-fledged disagreement (e.g., Huvenes, 
2011, 2017; Marques, 2015). But even assuming this issue is solved, a claim could be made that 
there are disagreements that are best not interpreted as a clash of non-cognitive attitudes. 
For example, in scenarios in which both interlocutors use predicates of taste exocentrically 
(like the one in which my friend and I are planning to take our common friend to lunch for 
her birthday) and disagreement ensues, the disagreement is arguably doxastic (in the case of 
my friend and I about the perspective-specific proposition that marmitako is delicious from 
our common friend’s perspective). This points to the need for the contextualist to appeal to 
doxastic disagreement as well, in addition to appeal to disagreement as clash of non-cognitive 
attitudes. This, in turn, immediately raises the question of theoretical parsimony: a view that 
needs to appeal to two notions of disagreement is clearly costlier than a view that appeals to 
only one such notion.15 But while things might not be as clear-cut as the contextualist wishes 
in this respect, the strategy of appealing to “disagreement in attitude” offers the contextualist 
enough leeway to approach the challenge from disagreement and thus cannot be ignored in 
further discussions of the issue.
The third contextualist strategy to answer the challenge from disagreement tackled in this 
paper consists in “going pragmatic”: that is, to construe the disagreement in exchanges like 
the one between my friend and I about marmitako as a pragmatic, rather than semantic 
phenomenon. This in itself doesn’t require abandoning (DD), but merely relegating it at the 
pragmatic level. And since there are quite a few phenomena that are traditionally considered 
to be pragmatic, the variants of this strategy are numerous.
To start with, one way to relegate disagreement at the pragmatic level is to claim that it 
involves presuppositions. First, it is easy to note that disagreement can target not what has 
been asserted, but what is presupposed in a given context (see Sundell, 2011; Plunkett & 
Sundell, 2013 for convincing examples). This suggests that the disagreement between my 
friend and I could also be interpreted as disagreement over what is presupposed, and not 
about what is asserted. But which presupposition is it that the two of us disagree about?
A recent view that situates disagreement at the level of presuppositions is Silk’s (2016). Silk’s 
basic idea is that, in order to retrieve the semantic content of an utterance, we make certain 
presuppositions about the values of the required contextual parameters, values that are 
provided by context. In the case of predicates of taste, for example, when one utters a sentence 
like (1) one presupposes a certain value of the contextually-given perspective parameter that 
14  One way to go is to say that in retreating to the qualified statement one is limiting the range of individuals the 
normative component of the utterance is supposed to apply to. Insofar as this makes sense (isn’t normativity supposed 
to be universal?), it opens up the question of what that range of individuals is to begin with. 
15  One way out for the contextualist would be to treat disagreement involving exocentric uses in the same way as 
that involving egocentric uses: as clash of non-cognitive attitudes. However, two considerations militate against this 
solution: first, it is difficult to argue that in using a predicate of taste exocentrically, one is expressing an attitude in the 
genuine sense of the term (Buekens (2011) forcefully argues against this claim); second, if the contextualist allows any 
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makes the semantic content expressed by the sentence to be what it is. In understanding 
what has been said, the hearer retrieves that value of the perspective parameter and, if she 
doesn’t object, the presupposition is accommodated and that value is added to the common 
ground. However, the hearer may not agree with the speaker: in this case, the presupposition 
is not accommodated and the relevant value is not added to the common ground. Thus, 
disagreement is explained by Silk as a refusal from the hearer’s part to accommodate the 
presupposition that the required value of the contextual parameter is as the speaker intends 
it to be. It is an explanation that involves a standard semantics and ordinary discursive 
maneuvers, such as presupposition accommodation, and thus distinctively conservative.16
An earlier presuppositional view of disagreement – that belonging to López de Sa (2007, 2008, 
2015) – has a different take on the issue. While the previous view has construed disagreement 
as involving opposite presuppositions (or certain discursive maneuvers associated with them), 
for López de Sa disagreement becomes possible when a “presupposition of commonality” is in 
place. A presupposition of commonality being in place simply means that the interlocutors 
take themselves to be alike with respect to the relevant contextual parameter – in the case 
of (1), alike in taste. Disagreement arises, according to López de Sa, precisely when such a 
presupposition is in place, and is about whether the marmitako is delicious or not from the 
common perspective that is presupposed. However, when such a presupposition is not in place, 
López de Sa denies that disagreement arises and that usually the interlocutors retreat to 
claims made from their own individual perspectives.17
Other presuppositional views trade on different ideas of what the presuppositions that fuel 
disagreement are. For instance, Zakkou (2015) claims that disagreement becomes possible not 
when a presupposition of commonality is in place, as López de Sa has it, but rather when a 
“presupposition of superiority” is. A presupposition of superiority being in place means that 
the interlocutors take one of them to be better situated than the other with respect to the 
relevant contextual parameter – in the case of (1), better in taste. Disagreement arises because 
each interlocutor holds a different presupposition: namely, that she herself is the one with the 
superior taste.18 Another presuppositional view is that of Parsons (2013). According to Parsons, 
when one utters a sentence like (1), the presupposition is not that the interlocutors are alike in 
taste and hence that all interlocutors find marmitako delicious, but that they aren’t, and hence 
that one of them finds it delicious and the other doesn’t (he calls this “antisupposition”). 
Disagreement arises because, under the antisupposition mentioned, if what one of the 
interlocutors says is true, then what the other says is false (given the rules for negation laid 
out by Parsons, 2013, p. 166).
Another way disagreement can be thought of as pragmatic is to see it as arising at the level 
of implicatures. Detailed discussion of the suggestion to construe disagreements like the one 
between my friend and I about marmitako as arising at the level of implicatures can be found 
in many places: Huvenes (2011), Sundell (2011), Plunkett & Sundell (2013) etc. Here, however, 
I want to point towards a further point of convergence between contextualism and hybrid 
expressivism. Earlier hybrid expressivist views such as Barker’s (2000) or Finaly’s (2005) have 
16  For a similar view about accounting for disagreement in terms of discursive maneuvers, but which doesn’t rely on 
presuppositions, see Björnsson (2015).
17  More recently, López de Sa (2015) has clarified his position by holding that in such cases disagreement arises, but 
cannot be expressed by using the sentences at stake. In addition, he also holds that the existing disagreement should 
be cashed out as clash of non-cognitive attitudes.
18  Zakkou’s view is in fact more general, in that she doesn’t put weight on the distinction between presupposition 
and implicature (she talks about “pragmatically conveyed” content). She can thus figure in the next variant of the 
pragmatic strategy as well (see below).
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it that the evaluative component of a sentence containing moral terms is expressed by way 
of an implicature. As before, differences in such views come from the type of the implicature 
postulated (merely evaluative or normative etc.), but in principle most of these views can be 
applied to a wider range of perspectival expressions. Marques (2016), for example, claims that 
her hybrid expressivist view about aesthetic predicates can be cast in terms of implicatures.19
Finally, it has been proposed that pragmatic disagreement be cashed out in terms of 
disagreement about the meaning of words (“metalinguistic disagreement”) or about the 
context interlocutors are in (“metacontextual disagreement”). To name only a few works, 
Sundell (2011), Plunkett & Sundell (2013) and Plunkett (2015) contain a significant number 
of exchanges in which the disagreement the interlocutors have can be rightfully construed 
in such terms. As regarding the first type of disagreement, one way in which it can be cashed 
out is by having the interlocutors argue about the (Kaplanian) character of the relevant 
expressions (e.g., about the term ‘athlete’ - see Sundell, 2011). As regarding the second, the 
standard case here is taken to be Barker’s (2002) example involving the gradable adjective 
‘tall’: there are situations, Barker claims, in which what the interlocutors do is argue either 
about the comparison class or about the threshold that determines whether a person counts as 
tall – that is, about features of the context and not about, say, the actual height of the person. 
The suggestion then is that disagreement in exchanges like the one between my friend and 
I about marmitako can be seen as metalinguistic or metacontextual. A normative version of 
this strategy is possible too: instead of claiming that the disagreement is about what words 
mean or what context the interlocutors are in, the authors cited claim that the disagreement 
is about what words should mean or (perhaps more controversially) about what context the 
interlocutors should be in.
All the pragmatic strategies mentioned point towards interesting aspects of our usage of 
perspectival expressions like predicates of taste. Given the pervasive presence of pragmatic 
effects in our language use, it would be quite surprising if disagreement were limited only to 
semantics. However, the pragmatic strategy faces several challenges. For one, it is notoriously 
difficult to pry apart purely semantic phenomena from pragmatic ones. Both in the case 
of presuppositions and implicatures there is still a vivid debate surrounding the viability 
of the classical tests for such phenomena.20 Further, it is questionable whether rendering 
disagreement in such a way does justice to all the cases of intuitive disagreement (one 
relevant question being what happens when the presuppositions or implicatures postulated 
are not in place21). As for metalinguistic and metacontextual disagreements, while it is hard 
to deny that such disagreements exist, claiming that all disagreements involving perspectival 
expressions are of this kind might go one step too far. For example, it seems very intuitive 
that in ordinary scenarios people disagree not about words or contexts, but about the very 
topic of their discussion; in the exchange between my friend and I, it is very intuitive to 
think that the disagreement is over whether marmitako is, in fact, delicious,22 and not over 
the word ‘delicious’ itself. Second, as several authors have pointed out, talk and belief about 
language and talk and belief about the world can coexist. This has important methodological 
implications: as Lassiter (2011) writes about what he calls “mixed uses” of predicates of taste 
(both ordinary and metalinguistic), “[t]his aspect is important because beliefs about the 
world and beliefs about language obviously do interact: we would not want a theory that 
19  To be more precise, Marques claims that her view can be cast either in terms of presuppositions or in terms of 
generalized conversational implicatures. I thank a referee for drawing my attention to this.
20  See, for example, Åkerman (2015) for a discussion of the cancellation test for conversational implicatures.
21  See, for example, Marques & García-Carpintero (2014) for making this point against López de Sa.
22  Whatever that fact might amount to. I leave metaphysical considerations about deliciousness aside in this paper. 
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separates them completely” (132, fn. 1). Applied to the case of disagreement, this observation 
amounts to the claim that disagreements about the world and disagreement about language 
can coexist. This, in turn, means that treating disagreement involving “mixed uses” as solely 
metalinguistic or metacontextual would leave one crucial aspect of their use (that is, the one 
concerning the world) unexplained. Unless an argument is given to rule out the possibility 
of “mixed uses” being part of ordinary exchanges like the one between my friend and I 
about mamitako,23 this strategy is incomplete. Thus, both the existence of disagreements 
that are intuitively non-metalinguistic or non-metacontextual and that of “mixed” cases 
of disagreement make a strong case against the claim that the strategy under scrutiny is a 
satisfactory answer to the challenge from disagreement.24 That being said, this strategy, as 
the one before, points to important aspects of our use of predicates of taste and thus has to be 
carefully considered in the next phase of the debate.
***
This completes the overview of recent contextualist strategies responding to the challenge 
from disagreement and their main variants. Needless to say, other strategies/variants are 
possible; also, some authors appeal to more than one strategy to explain the whole range 
of data (e.g., López de Sa, 2015). Whether or not the strategies presented, in themselves or 
in combination with others, are ultimately successful in dealing with the challenge from 
disagreement is something that needs to be further inquired into. In any case, they have all 
significantly advanced the debate surrounding disagreement in semantics and are thus well 
worth engaging with in the future.
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